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Abstract
An Ebola outbreak of unprecedented scope emerged in West Africa in December 2013 and
presently continues unabated in the countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Ebola
is not new to Africa, and outbreaks have been confirmed as far back as 1976. The current
West African Ebola outbreak is the largest ever recorded and differs dramatically from prior
outbreaks in its duration, number of people affected, and geographic extent. The emer-
gence of this deadly disease in West Africa invites many questions, foremost among these:
why now, and why in West Africa? Here, we review the sociological, ecological, and envi-
ronmental drivers that might have influenced the emergence of Ebola in this region of Africa
and its spread throughout the region. Containment of the West African Ebola outbreak is
the most pressing, immediate need. A comprehensive assessment of the drivers of Ebola
emergence and sustained human-to-human transmission is also needed in order to prepare
other countries for importation or emergence of this disease. Such assessment includes
identification of country-level protocols and interagency policies for outbreak detection and
rapid response, increased understanding of cultural and traditional risk factors within and
between nations, delivery of culturally embedded public health education, and regional co-
ordination and collaboration, particularly with governments and health ministries throughout
Africa. Public health education is also urgently needed in countries outside of Africa in order
to ensure that risk is properly understood and public concerns do not escalate unnecessari-
ly. To prevent future outbreaks, coordinated, multiscale, early warning systems should be
developed that make full use of these integrated assessments, partner with local communi-
ties in high-risk areas, and provide clearly defined response recommendations specific to
the needs of each community.
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Introduction
On December 6, 2013, the world’s largest Ebola epidemic began when a two-year-old in Guéck-
édou, Guinea, a small village bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia, became infected (Fig 1) [1,2].
This is the first documented Ebola outbreak outside Central Africa and is unique in its size, du-
ration, and spatial extent. The circulating virus has been identified as the Zaire ebolavirus
(EBOV), a strain previously found in only three Central African countries: the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC), Republic of the Congo, and Gabon (Fig 1) [3]. The public health
impact of the current Ebola epidemic in West Africa has been far greater than case counts.
Massive indirect effects on already-weakened public services have occurred, including signifi-
cant crippling of the health sector, which has increased the impacts of other endemic diseases
and the associated mortality [3]. Substantial economic loss and social disruption will have a
sustained impact on the region that will far outlive the actual epidemic [4]. One paper, pub-
lished in 2011, argued that Ebola would never become a significant public health threat in Af-
rica [4]; clearly, the threat of Ebola has been underestimated. The emergence of Ebola in West
Africa invites many questions—most of which remain unresolved—notably: why now, and
why in West Africa? Advancing our understanding of this outbreak remains critical to present
health care interventions as well as the prevention of further outbreaks. Here, we review the
Fig 1. Map of Ebola outbreaks in Africa. The outbreak in West Africa is unprecedented in its scope and duration, occurring for the first time in urban
centers. Historically, Ebola viral outbreaks (stars, timeline right) occurred sporadically, limited largely to Central African rural areas where the human
population (grey to red gradient stippling [5,6]) has been low or more remote from areas of high population density. It is uncertain how frequent Ebola
outbreaks will be in the future, given the identification of wildlife spillover potential in West Africa and the increasingly concentrated human populations in
this region.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g001
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sociological, ecological, and environmental drivers that could have influenced the emergence
of EBOV inWest Africa at this time and in this manner. Given these factors, we explore the les-
sons of this outbreak and evaluate how we might manage future threats from Ebola across the
complex urban and rural landscapes that define modern Africa.
Ebola in Africa
Ebola hemorrhagic fever is an emerging zoonotic viral disease that historically has occurred in
rural areas of Central Africa, with isolated cases identified elsewhere (Fig 1 and Table 1). The
Ebola virus was first identified in humans in southern Sudan in 1976 [7], but likely occurred as
early as 1972 in Tandala, DRC [8]. The virus causes severe morbidity and high mortality in hu-
mans and wildlife [9]. Humans typically are infected with Ebola either through contact with
bodily fluids of infected animals or humans, or through consumption of bushmeat, caring for
patients, or preparing the deceased for burial (Fig 2) [10]. EBOV can be found in a number of
human secretions during the acute phase of infection, such as saliva, feces, semen, breast milk,
tears, nasal blood, and skin [11]. Presently, there is no vaccine or other therapeutic interven-
tions beyond supportive care, although promising pharmaceutical options are on the horizon,
including vaccines [12].
Virus invasion in humans appears to occur through mucosal surfaces, breaks and abrasions
in the skin, or parenteral introduction (reviewed in [18]). Route of exposure is important in de-
termining the course of disease. During the 1976 outbreak in the DRC, the incubation period
in humans exposed to EBOV through injection (in association with unsterilized needle reuse)
was shorter than individuals exposed through known contacts (5–9 days, in respect of virus
strains circulating in that outbreak [19]). Case fatality rates also differed by exposure route,
with 100% mortality among those exposed through injection (85 out of 85) and 80% among
cases with known contact (119 of 149). In laboratory studies of EBOV infection in nonhuman
primates, the disease course was more rapid with exposure through intramuscular or intraperi-
toneal injection than through aerosol droplets [20]. Aerosol transmission has been identified
only in laboratory settings [21] and is thought to be rare or absent in natural outbreaks [18].
Oral and conjunctival EBOV exposure was found to be extremely lethal in experimentally in-
fected rhesus macaques [22]. Additionally, organs from laboratory-infected, nonhuman pri-
mates had extremely high infectivity titers (5.5–8.6 log10 pfu/g, [20]), indicating that exposure
to high infectious doses might occur with consumption.
West African outbreak 2014
TheWorld Health Organization (WHO) designated the West African outbreak as a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on August 8, 2014 [23]. As of October
25, the WHO reported 10,141 cases and 4,922 deaths, making this ongoing outbreak several
times larger than all previous Ebola outbreaks combined (Fig 3A) [24]. Even so, those numbers
may be a drastic underestimate of the true case burden. In late August, the WHO estimates the
true prevalence to be two to four times higher than the reported figures [25]. The outbreak is
concentrated in the capitals of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, although cases have occurred
in nearly all regions of these countries.
Presently, there is little evidence of epidemic control in West Africa (Table 2) [26,27]. The
recently developed model EbolaResponse provides a tool to estimate the potential increase in
Ebola cases (available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15620/cdc.24900) [27]. It was predicted that if
there were no significant changes made in outbreak management, the total number of Ebola
cases could reach 21,000 in Liberia and Sierra Leone by the end of September 2014 [27]. This
forecast included a correction for estimates of suspected under-reporting [27]. Despite this
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Table 1. Ebola Outbreaks in Africa.
Date Location of first case Countries affected Strain Number of
human cases
Number of
human deaths
Mortality Reservoir
Aug 2014–
present
Equator Province, DRC DRC SUDV 67 49 73% Possibly fruit bats
Dec 2013–
present
Guéckédou, Guinea Guinea, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Nigeria, Senegal
EBOV 5481* 2946 54% Fruit bats
Jun 2012–
Nov 2012
Province Orientale, DRC DRC BDBV 77 36 47% Unknown, although
bushmeat likely
Jun 2012–
Aug 2012
Kibaale District, Uganda Uganda SUDV 24 17 71% Unknown
Dec 2008–
Feb 2009
Kasai-Occidental
Province, DRC
DRC EBOV 32 14 45% Unknown
Dec 2007–
Jan 2008
Bundibugyo District,
Uganda
Uganda BDBV 149 37 25% Unknown
May 2007–
Nov 2007
Kasai-Occidental
Province, DRC
DRC EBOV 264 187 71% Fruit bats
Apr 2004–
Aug 2004
Yambio county, Sudan Sudan SUDV 17 7 41% Unknown
Nov 2003–
Dec 2003
Mbono District, Congo Congo EBOV 35 29 83% Gorilla
Dec 2002–
Apr 2003
Mbono and Kéllé Districts,
Congo
Congo EBOV 143 128 90% Possibly duiker,
chimpanzee, and
gorilla
Oct 2001–
Jul 2002
Makokou and Mékouka,
Gabon Border
Gabon, Congo EBOV 122 96 79% Possibly duiker,
chimpanzee, and
gorilla
2000–2001 Gulu, Masinsi, and
Mbarara districts, Uganda
Uganda SUDV 425 224 53% Unknown
Jul 1996–
Jan 1997
Booué, Gabon Gabon EBOV 60 45 75% Chimpanzee
Oct 1996 Johannesburg, South
Africa
South Africa EBOV 2 1 N/A Human travelling from
Gabon
Jan 1996–
Apr 1996
Mayibout, Gabon Gabon EBOV 37 21 57% Chimpanzee
1995 Kikwit, DRC DRC EBOV 315 250 79% Possibly fruit bats
Nov 1994 Taï National Park, Ivory
Coast
Ivory Coast TAFV 1 0 0% Chimpanzee
1994 Mékouka, Gabon Gabon EBOV 52 31 60% Gorilla
1979 Nzara and Maridi, Sudan Sudan SUDV 34 22 65% Unknown
1977 Tandala, DRC DRC EBOV 1 1 N/A Unknown
Aug 1976 Yambuku, DRC DRC EBOV 318 280 88% Possibly antelope or
monkey
Jun 1976–
Nov 1976
Nzara and Maridi, Sudan Sudan SUDV 284 151 53% Possibly fruit bats
Ebola outbreaks have been confirmed in Africa since 1976 [6]. Since then, four different strains of Ebola have emerged in Central and West Africa, from
varying presumptive wildlife sources. These strains include Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV), Sudan ebolavirus (SUDV), Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV) and Taï
Forest ebolavirus (TAFV).
*Number of laboratory-confirmed cases only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.t001
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estimate being significantly less than the current reported number of cases [24], Ebola trans-
mission is still widespread and intense in the West Africa region (Figs 3B and 4) [24,28].
EBOV infections have occurred beyond these core outbreak countries in Nigeria, Senegal, and
Mali [24]. Model simulations using mobility and airline data indicate the threat of international
dissemination beyond the Africa region through air travel is limited [29], despite secondary
spread occurring in Spain and the United States [24]. Current intervention focus is on the
rapid increase in treatment facilities and capacity to isolate infected patients in the affected
countries in order to reduce Ebola transmission within the population [27,30].
Concerns of epidemic spread beyond Africa to places such as the US have occupied the pub-
lic’s attention and now have become important topics of concern and fear. A recent national
survey found 39% of adult respondents believed there would be a large outbreak of Ebola with-
in the US in the next 12 months [31]. Respondents with lower levels of education were more
likely to express these views [24]. Unlike other viruses, such as influenza, that are airborne and
can be transmitted through casual contact [32], Ebola requires direct physical contact with
bodily fluids from a clinically ill person [15]. Accordingly, the only two cases of secondary
transmission to occur in the US were associated with nursing staff and care of an Ebola patient
[33]. Since these events, CDC guidelines and other safety protocols have been revised and
strengthened [34]. More aggressive approaches, such as mandatory quarantine for returning
medical personnel, have also been employed in some states [35], creating concerns that unnec-
essary fear and precaution may impact medical personnel and willingness to assist in the West
African outbreak [36]. Public health education is urgently needed not only in West Africa but
also within the US.
Full genome sequencing of EBOV isolates from the Sierra Leone outbreak region from
May–August of 2014 (n = 99) [37] and previous molecular sequencing studies of a limited
number of Guinean EBOV cases [10] provided similar results, suggesting that the West African
outbreak arose from a single spillover event from a wildlife reservoir with subsequent sustained
Fig 2. Schematic of virus spillover fromwildlife and human-to-human transmission. Pathogen spillover to humans is typically associated with the use
of bushmeat and direct contact with tissues and/or bodily fluids through handling and eating of infected animals (A), e.g., duiker, primates, or fruit bats [13].
Predation and consumption of a red colobus monkey by chimpanzees has also been linked to an outbreak of Ebola among chimpanzees and one researcher
in Côte d'Ivoire [14]. Ingestion of fruit contaminated with Ebola-infected bat saliva or feces may be another mechanism by which bats might infect other
involved wildlife species (e.g., duiker, nonhuman primates) or even humans. Human-to-human transmission has been associated with traditional burial
practices, caregiving, or some other form of direct physical contact with infected individuals or bodily fluids [15]. Transmission dynamics in high-density urban
centers (C) will differ importantly from rural villages (B), influencing outbreak progression and control efforts. Transmission in the hospital setting is largely
associated with failures in infection control procedures and standard barrier precautions (D), many of which are related to inadequate staffing, infrastructure,
and financing of health care systems [16,17].
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g002
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Fig 3. Case counts of historical Ebola outbreaks and the current outbreak in West Africa [24]. A) The 2014West Africa outbreak eclipses all previous
known outbreaks, with more cases and deaths than the other events combined. B) Cumulative case counts in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone demonstrate
widespread transmission. Presently, Liberia is experiencing intense growth of the disease outbreak, with dozens of new cases each day.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g003
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human-to-human transmission. However, important spatial and temporal limitations existed
in sample collection in these studies. Accordingly, these conclusions can only be applied to the
region of the outbreak area assessed. Additional studies will be necessary to fully understand
EBOV transmission dynamics and the role of virus spillover from animal hosts.
Is the virus in the West African outbreak changing?
Phylogenetic analyses indicate that the virus strain in the current outbreak likely originated
from Central Africa around 2004 [37]. In Sierra Leone, the outbreak is believed to have started
from the introduction of two genetically different viruses from Guinea, where people were at-
tending a funeral [37]. These two viruses diverged in Guinea in late April, before they were dis-
covered in Sierra Leone a month later [37]. These sequencing efforts identified 396 genetic
mutations that have occurred over time, including 50 nonsynonymous mutations since separa-
tion from the Central African lineage. During this current outbreak, the frequency of nucleo-
tide substitution rates has been approximately two times higher than that observed across all
previous Ebola outbreaks from which sequence data were available. Substitutions have been
more commonly nonsynonymous [37], which change the amino acid sequence of the virus and
could potentially be correlated with phenotypic changes that might influence outbreak dynam-
ics and virus behavior. While more research is required to understand the effect of increased
nonsynonymous mutation rates in the West Africa EBOV virus population, the sustained
Table 2. Epidemiological characteristics of the 2014West African Ebola outbreak.
Summary of Ebola outbreak characteristics in West Africa
December–September 2014 [26]
Term Definition Current
estimates
Reproductive number
(R0):
Number of healthy people one sick individual infects over the
course of his/her illness.
Guinea: 1.71
Liberia: 1.83
Sierra Leone:
2.02
Serial interval: Time between consecutive people falling ill in a chain of
transmission.
15.3 days
Incubation period: Amount of time passed between a person becoming
exposed to Ebola and when they start to show symptoms of
the disease.
11.4 days
Doubling time: Time taken for the number of sick individuals to double. Guinea: 15.7
days
Liberia: 23.6 days
Sierra Leone:
30.2 days
Confirmed case fatality
rate:
Number of people who die of confirmed Ebola infection. Guinea: 70.7%
Liberia: 72.3%
Sierra Leone
69.0%
Unconfirmed case
fatality rate:
Number of people who die with suspected but not
confirmed Ebola infection.
Guinea: 13%
Liberia: 58%
Sierra Leone:
35%
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.t002
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nature of the outbreak increases the opportunity for further change in the virus, with uncertain
consequences [37]. However, as yet, similarity in outbreak characteristics (including R0, symp-
toms, incubation time, serial time) between the West Africa 2014 outbreak and previous Ebola
outbreaks suggests that there has not been any significant change in the virus affecting trans-
missibility (Table 2) [26]. Rather, outbreak progression appears to be more strongly influenced
by the urban setting of the outbreak and other socioeconomic features.
The Democratic Republic of Congo 2014
A second outbreak of Ebola was discovered in the rural Boende region of the DRC in August
2014 (Figs 1 and 5). The index case was identified as a pregnant woman who handled bush-
meat. Subsequent infections in the community stemmed from contact with the woman’s body
during funeral rituals [38]. Phylogenetic analysis confirmed it to be a different strain, unrelated
to the 2014 West African outbreak, indicating that a separate zoonotic introduction was re-
sponsible for viral emergence into the DRC population [39]. This virus strain is most closely re-
lated to virus isolated from the 1995 Ebola outbreak that occurred in Kikwit, DRC. As of
October 21, 2014, the outbreak had grown to 67 cases and 49 deaths [38].
Fig 4. West Africa Ebola case counts at biweekly intervals. An assessment of EBOV outbreaks in which circles identify two-week intervals in outbreak
progression, and distance between the circle lines is equivalent to the number of cases affected during that respective time period. The graphic highlights the
important differences in outbreak duration and case counts not only betweenWest Africa and Central Africa EBOV epidemics but also by country within the
outbreak region in West Africa itself. Liberia clearly has had the largest number of cases over the shortest duration. This reflects, in part, the movement of the
outbreak into the high-density urban center—the capital city Monrovia—and the intense growth of the outbreak from that point.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g004
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Pathogen Spillover
Spillover of EBOV from the wildlife reservoir to human populations appears to be a complex
process involving a number of coupled networks and seasonal drivers (Fig 2) [46], linking the
human host to virus reservoirs. Several bat species are considered to be putative EBOV reser-
voirs, three of which have been a focus of attention with respect to the current West African
outbreak: the hammer-headed fruit bat (Hypsignathus monstrosus), the little collared fruit bat
(Myonycteris torquata), and the straw-coloured fruit bat (Eidolon helvum) [41,42]. Only frugiv-
orous and insectivorous bat species have shown virus replication and developed high circulat-
ing virus titers without showing EBOV-associated illness [47]. Virus found in lung tissues and
feces indicates that respiratory, oral, and fecal transmission pathways may all be possible expo-
sure routes to susceptible hosts. Outbreak range overlap is identified in a number of bat species
in which EBOV antibodies have previously been found (Fig 5). Some bat species, such as the
straw-coloured fruit bat, the largest ranging bats species in Africa, have the ability to migrate
long distances (up to 2,500 km) [48]. Thus, movement of EBOV through bat colonies from
Central Africa into West Africa would be possible. Alternatively, the virus may have been in
the reservoir host for some time, but conditions for spillover did not occur previously.
Fig 5. Range of bat species suspected of being reservoirs of Ebola, human population density, and Ebola case counts by location in West Africa.
The range of putative EBOV reservoir species the little collared fruit bat (yellow), the hammer-headed fruit bat (blue), and the straw-coloured fruit bat (green)
are thought to be associated with previous Central African EBOV outbreaks [40–42]. Guéckédou, Guinea, was the first affected area in December of 2013
(star) [12] with spread to other regions (blue—location of confirmed, red—recent confirmed cases as of October 20, 2014 [43]. The outbreak now involves
Sierra Leone and Liberia. Limited spread, in Nigeria and Senegal (only one case), related to travel of infected persons has been identified. A separate Ebola
outbreak in the DRC was reported on August 25, 2014 (map inset) [44]. Human-mediated loss of forest resources (2000–2012, red stippling) has been
dramatic in the region [45]. In addition to bushmeat-associated exposure, human-mediated environmental change in the region could increase human
contact with potentially infected bat species in both the urban and rural environment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g005
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EBOV transmission to wildlife species (e.g., duiker, nonhuman primates) is thought to
occur with ingestion of fruit that has been contaminated with infected fruit bat saliva or feces
[41]. Chimpanzees, however, are different and in addition to consuming fruit, will actively en-
gage in predation of other wildlife and nonhuman primates, hunting cooperatively and sharing
meat among their social group, a behavior rarely observed in other nonhuman primates, with
the exception of baboons [49]. In addition, only chimpanzees will carry meat away from the
site of predation—in some instances, more than a kilometer. Scavenging of meat from carcasses
is, however, rarely identified among any nonhuman primate species. Chimpanzee hunting has
previously been linked to Ebola emergence in Côte d'Ivoire, where the hunting and shared con-
sumption of a red colobus monkey was associated with a large outbreak of Ebola among chim-
panzees (Fig 2) [14]. This was the first record of “bushmeat” consumption causing an Ebola
outbreak in a nonhuman primate population. A large-scale survey of nonhuman primates
across Central Africa only found significant serologic evidence of exposure among chimpan-
zees (12.9%), suggesting that non-lethal infections do occur in nonhuman primates [50]. Sero-
positive chimpanzees were found broadly throughout forested regions of Central Africa,
identifying Ebola viral circulation in areas where human infections have not yet been identified
(e.g., Cameroon [50]). Serosurveillance studies among humans in Central Africa have also
identified seropositive individuals even in the absence of a history of Ebola infection or resi-
dence in an area where an Ebola outbreak occurred [51]. Understanding spillover in humans
continues to be a challenging issue, given the relative infrequency of these events. Important
similarities exist in both the physiology and behavior of chimpanzees and humans. Focused re-
search on chimpanzees might provide important insight into Ebola spillover pathways arising
from hunting and consumption of bushmeat.
What is the role of nonhuman primates in virus circulation?
Ebola is a rapidly fatal disease for nonhuman primates [52]. Although a potential source of in-
fection for humans through consumption of dead apes, nonhuman primates are not considered
to be a reservoir host or a host species able to maintain sustained viral transmission indepen-
dent of contact with the reservoir host [52]. Indeed, outbreak mortality in chimpanzees and go-
rillas has been extreme with some outbreaks, pushing these species closer to extinction [9]. The
2002–2003 epidemic of Ebola in gorillas in the Lossi Sanctuary in northwest Republic of Congo
killed 90%–95% of the population, an estimated 5,000 animals [53].
Seasonal triggers of Ebola outbreaks
Meteorological factors have been associated with a variety of infectious diseases and can have
complex influence over contact networks and disease transmission pathways [54]. This is par-
ticularly true when wildlife reservoirs are involved in pathogen spillover to other wildlife spe-
cies and humans. Local and regional weather patterns act as a strong determinant of floral
characteristics and surface water attributes within a given landscape. The nature and distribu-
tion of these resources can dynamically influence animal behavior, as well as species distribu-
tion, species fitness, migration patterns, and population density. These attendant effects can
have a profound impact on contact probabilities between susceptible and infected hosts within
and between species, as well as the potential for pathogen transmission and spillover to humans
[55]. Additionally, contact probabilities can be altered by deforestation and land-use change,
which may compound the impact of meteorological phenomena and further cluster susceptible
and infected hosts around more limited resources.
There has been little analysis of the meteorological and hydrologic conditions associated
with Ebola outbreaks. Study of these processes has been hampered by the limited availability of
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meteorological station observations in Central Africa. A few studies have attempted to circum-
vent this issue through use of satellite estimates of land surface greenness. In this fashion, Pin-
zon et al. (2004) examined eight Ebola outbreaks during 1994–2002 and found an association
with drier-than-normal conditions at the end of the rainy season. Certainly, hydrologic
changes could influence forest fruit production and other resources. Foraging behavior in fru-
givorous species (e.g., fruit bats, duikers, and nonhuman primates) can be strongly influenced
by seasonally driven temporal and spatial clustering of scarce fruit resources [56], potentially
concentrating reservoir and susceptible host species in these areas of increased foraging oppor-
tunity (Fig 6). A recent study identifies the potential zoonotic transmission niche as a region
that covers more than 22 countries in Central and West Africa. These areas are defined by
characteristic vegetation, elevation, temperature, evapotranspiration, and range of suspected
bat reservoirs [57].
Human-mediated landscape alteration—Increased contact with EBOV
reservoirs?
In the outbreak zone, human-mediated environmental change has been significant, potentially
contributing to the emergence of EBOV. The Guinean forest surrounding the outbreak areas is
considered a major biodiversity hotspot, containing an estimated one-quarter of all African
mammalian fauna [58]. Human encroachment into these areas has been dramatic, with cumu-
lative forest loss estimated to be between 83%–86% (Fig 5) [59]. The landscape is now dominat-
ed by forest-agricultural mosaics [58]. These environmental changes in the outbreak region
may provide the opportunity for direct exposure to infected bats, potentially creating transmis-
sion pathways that do not rely on exposure to bushmeat. For example, the little collared fruit
bat can be found in forest/grassland mosaics, an increasing feature of the landscape, and has
been identified feeding on guavas and mangoes [60], as well as occurring in more urban areas
such as city gardens [61]. Straw-coloured bats have also been identified in human-modified en-
vironments, including city parks [62]. The hammer-headed fruit bat can be found in a wide
range of habitats, including agricultural areas, where they have been recorded feeding on culti-
vated crops [63]. The two-year-old child who is the index case in the West African outbreak is
Fig 6. Seasonal factors may influences forage and wildlife distributions, potentially increasing their contact with Ebola reservoirs. Ebola outbreaks
appear to coincide with seasonal factors, which can influence forage availability and spatial distribution across the landscape, potentially increasing contact
between wildlife species and EBOV transmission potential. Fighting and breeding among bat species during these periods is thought to potentially influence
viral load and EBOV transmission within and between bat species.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g006
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assumed to have been exposed by eating bushmeat [10]. However, the child could well have
been exposed to bat-contaminated fruit or other bat excretions within the home environment
where EBOV-infected bats may occur [41]—a more likely exposure route than eating bush-
meat if, indeed, the two-year-old was the first case. It will be important to determine whether
Ebola spillover can occur independently of bushmeat utilization and exposure.
Social Conditions Enabling and Enhancing Human-to-Human
Transmission
War, population growth, poverty, and poor health infrastructure, among other social condi-
tions in the outbreak region, have likely contributed to the unprecedented expanse, duration,
and size of the EBOV epidemic in West Africa (Table 3). In this region of Africa, population
growth has been dramatic, with population densities (people/km2) increasing by 223%, 178%,
and 275% in Guinea (1960–2012), Sierra Leone, and Liberia, respectively (1961–2013, Fig 7A)
[64]. Rural-to-urban migration and growth in the affected countries has significantly increased
the proportion of people living in urban environments, where EBOV outbreaks have focused
in West Africa. The proportion of the population that is now urbanized has increased signifi-
cantly in Guinea (248%, 1960–2013), Sierra Leone, and Liberia (130% and 163% respectively,
1960–2013, Fig 7B) [64].
Human mobility
A complex suite of sociological and economic factors influence human movement across the
landscape and can have critical impacts on outbreak dynamics and the spatial spread of infec-
tious disease [65]. In West Africa, human movement is considered a particular characteristic of
the region [66], with migration rates exceeding movement in the rest of the world by more
than 7-fold [67]. An estimated 11% of West African people live outside their country of birth,
with between 30%–40% of people residing outside their district or village of birth [68]. In Libe-
ria, for example, 54% of the population over the age of 14 are identified as being internally
Table 3. Socioeconomic and environmental factors may have influenced Ebola emergence in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone [64].
Country Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone
Environmental features Country size 94,926 sq miles
(245,857 km2)
43,000 sq miles
(111,370 km2)
27,699 sq miles
(71,740 km2)
Crop production index increase (2004–
2006 = 100) (1961–2012)
246% 118% 388%
Livestock production index increase (2004–
2006 = 100) (1961–2012)
346% 305% 328%
Human resources and
infrastructure
Number of physicians (per 1,000 people in
2010)
0.1 0.01 0.02
Improved sanitation (Total, Rural, Urban) 19%, 11%, 33% 17%, 6%, 28% 13%, 7%, 23%
Improved water source (% of population
without access in 2012)
25% 25% 40%
Population features Urban population increase (% of population
(1960–2013)
223% increase
(1960–2012)
275% increase
(1961–2013)
178% increase
(1961–2013)
Historical civil unrest Yes Yes Yes
Literacy (% of people age 15 and above) 25% in 2010 43% in 2008 44% in 2012
Cultural and behavioral
features
Use of traditional healers High High High
Use of traditional burial practices High High High
Bushmeat consumption High High High
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.t003
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Fig 7. Increases in population density and the proportion living in urban environments in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone since the 1960s. A)
Population density in the outbreak region has increased dramatically over the last 40 years [64]. Increases in human density can have a critical influence on
contact networks and human-to-human transmission potential and environmental degradation. Increasing need for natural resources can potentially increase
contact rates with wildlife (e.g., timber). B) Urbanization is an important factor influencing infrastructural needs, resources, and population density, factors that
can influence contact networks, outbreak dynamics, and intervention success. This is particularly true in poorer countries, where rapidly progressing disease
outbreaks in urban environments outstrip weak public health resources. Liberia has experienced the greatest increase in urban population, with an estimated
253% increase since 1961.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g007
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displaced [69]. Large-scale population movements in the region, both within and between
countries, have been driven by decades of conflict and the search for improved socioeconomic
conditions and opportunities, identifying an important part of regional livelihood strategies for
the poor [68]. As such, present-day population mobility in West Africa has been an important
contributing factor to the explosive nature of the West African Ebola outbreak.
The location and nature of the index case and spillover event has also been important to the
rapid spread of the epidemic. In this case, the index cluster of infections occurred in Guécké-
dou, Guinea, a small village bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia near major road networks
[1,2]. Infected individuals moved rapidly from the originally infected village into other loca-
tions, eventually leading to human introduction of EBOV into major urban centers, such as the
capital city of Liberia, Monrovia (mid-June 2014) [70]. Regional expansion of the outbreak to
Senegal and Nigeria was associated with travel from affected regions. Fear of rapid Ebola spread
across the continent and globe has precipitated border controls on movement to and from the
affected countries [71]. Border controls themselves, however, can have important negative im-
pacts on the outbreak, preventing movement of urgently needed supplies and resources,
prompting the United Nations Security Council to call for an end to the isolation of affected
countries [71].
Decades of civil unrest
From 1989 to 2004, sustained armed conflict raged in West Africa, moving across borders
among Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire. Violence, looting, and pillaging be-
came an economic opportunity for impoverished people, and a large mercenary force devel-
oped in the region [72]. Mass refugee movements and resettlement camps created a large
group of displaced and vulnerable people, with the associated environmental impacts that per-
sist today [73]. These regional environmental and societal disturbances have impacted infra-
structure, governance, social cohesion, and the mental and physical health and livelihoods of
people in the region [74,75]. These effects have also severely undermined societal resiliency as
well as public health infrastructure and service delivery in the region [75,76].
Behavioral and cultural practices
Consideration of behavior and culture in disease transmission is critical to control and under-
standing transmission dynamics [77]. Cultural diversity shapes African nations between and
within countries and can have a profound influence on social cohesion and communication,
particularly during times of disturbance. For example, Liberia has at least 16 major ethnic and
cultural groups, each described by a specific language and associated dialects, religion, tradi-
tions, and customs [78]. EBOV, because of its nature of transmission, is particularly influenced
by cultural and behavioral practices that occur at the household and community levels and
within a hospital setting (patient care, family involvement and role, health-seeking behaviors
and responses). Consequently, there is no one “community,” and the cultural diversity that de-
fines the region will need to be considered in local disease emergence prevention as well as in
the public health response.
Bushmeat consumption
Bushmeat utilization has been identified as the primary mechanism of EBOV spillover from
wildlife reservoirs to humans. Rapid human migration to urban centers has placed increased
pressure on the region for food production [58], including access to bushmeat, a preferred pro-
tein source [79]. In Liberia, timber extraction, opening of road networks, and influx of worker
settlements has been linked to unprecedented increases in bushmeat extraction from forested
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regions [80]. Bushmeat in Liberia is a critical source of protein, estimated to account for three-
quarters of the country’s meat use [81]. In Brazaville, Republic of Congo, 88% of households
interviewed reported consuming bushmeat (n = 1,050), preferentially mammals (artiodactyls
[48.3%], rodents [28.3%], and primates [13.0%]) [82]. Bushmeat has become an important
commercial commodity, trafficked illegally both domestically and internationally, potentially
providing a mechanism for pathogen spread. Indeed, it has been estimated that approximately
5 tons of bushmeat are illegally imported into Europe each week [83], and it is a common form
of contraband moved within and between African nations [84]. While the Ebola virus is sus-
ceptible to a variety of disinfectants and can be inactivated by cooking (60°C for 60 minutes) or
boiling for five minutes [85], the virus can survive over three weeks at low temperatures in the
absence of disinfection or inactivation [86]. This is consistent with epidemiologic data, which
identified disease in game hunters [87–89], with none documented in individuals who ate the
game after cooking [87]. Wildlife biltong, a dried-meat delicacy that is widely consumed in Af-
rica and abroad, may pose special challenges [90], given that the virus can survive over 50 days
when dried and kept at 4°C [86]. At present there have been no confirmed cases of Ebola relat-
ed to the consumption of dried or smoked meat. However, there is still the concern that move-
ment of biltong could increase the infection risk of wildlife products well beyond the point of
animal slaughter to distant markets, given virus survival potential. Cultural practices can also
differ importantly as to what wildlife species are used, obtained, processed, and consumed, po-
tentially influencing Ebola transmission risk [77].
Burial practices
Traditional burial practices, involving washing and touching of the deceased, have been linked
to 60% of Ebola cases in Guinea [91]. Caregiving, primarily by women, has also been associated
with outbreaks, presumably explaining the relatively high rate of infection in women (67% of
affected individuals) in the 2000–2001 Ugandan outbreak [92]. When a traditional healer fell
ill with Ebola in Uganda, many individuals from the community came to care for her, and
when she died, they took part in her burial [92]. The infected individuals were all women.
Spread of the present outbreak into Sierra Leone was also associated with infection and death
of a traditional healer and the women who had participated in her funeral [37]. It is important
to note that burial practices can be divergent even within a nation, giving rise to the need to
consider ethnic diversity and cultural differences within and between villages, towns, nations,
and regions and their influence on funeral practices and pathogen transmission dynamics.
There is a need to identify more refined data on these activities so that appropriate regionally
and culturally specific public health practices can be developed. These data will also aid efforts
to model epidemic dynamics; as funerals are an important feature of transmission, the nature
of them will define epidemic spread.
Traditional medicine and cures
Traditional medicine is defined as the total knowledge base, skills, and associated practices that
arise from theories, beliefs, and experiences identified by different cultures and used in the
maintenance of health. Traditional medicine constitutes the world’s oldest health care, and it
has involved the development of culturally and geographically specific techniques for prevent-
ing illnesses and diagnosing and treating individuals and communities for centuries. While
modern health care based on Western medicine is now considered the norm in many coun-
tries, much of Western Africa still relies heavily on traditional practices. Indeed, in countries
surrounding the outbreak zone, such as Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, 70% of the population de-
pend solely on traditional medicine, while in Burkina Faso and the DRC, this figure increases
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to 80% of the population [93]. While traditional medicine can have a positive role in health
care, ethnomedical beliefs can also have important impacts on health-seeking behavior, health
outcomes, and pathogen transmission pathways.
Individuals often look to traditional healers and family members for advice and care de-
spite inexperience of the person providing information [94]. Traditional healers may have po-
sitions of influence within the community and, therefore, command a level of trust, and can
also have a significant influence on health-seeking behavior and uptake of health messages,
factors that can directly affect outbreak dynamics. Sick individuals have often opted to listen
to traditional healers and rumors about potential “cures,” for example the use of saltwater
baths and drinks that have led to recent deaths in Nigeria [95]. Drinking bleach was also con-
sidered a way to rid oneself of Ebola in the Ugandan outbreak of 2000–2001 [96]. In the 2005
Ebola outbreak in the Congo, traditional healers declared that cursed “dishonest hunters”
caused the outbreak, and many believed this to be true [97]. False information of this sort can
significantly affect outbreak dynamics and increase the length and severity of epidemics. En-
couragingly, the head of traditional healers in one district of Sierra Leone has recently stopped
treating patients, acknowledging that he knows very little about the virus, and called on other
healers to suspend healing activities until they are given adequate training [98]. Training tra-
ditional healers in infection control and delivery of public health messages might be an impor-
tant mechanism for the dissemination of information to local communities and reduction in
Ebola transmission risk.
Fear and obstruction of health interventions
Immense fear and anxiety exists toward modern health care providers in Ebola outbreak coun-
tries. This fear has stopped many individuals from seeking health care, causing them to instead
hide from authorities and revert to traditional healers or family members for care [91]. Sick in-
dividuals already admitted to health care facilities have also fled, fearing they will only die in
the hospital environment [91]. For example, in the Ugandan outbreak, people feared that once
they went to hospital they would never see their families again [92]. In a rural setting, these in-
fluences will be important, but in high-density communities, they can be catastrophic in their
effect on outbreak dynamics and control efforts. While health care and aid workers have the
very best of intentions, the nature and severity of the virus means that quick action must be
taken, resulting in the breakdown of communication between patients, relatives, and workers,
and the inability of traditional practices to take place, propagating more fear and distrust be-
tween the parties. This outcome stems in large part from a lack of understanding and familiari-
ty with Western medicine and practices [94], whereas community values often prioritize
traditional practices and consultation and see both as a critical step in any community process
engendering trust. For example, with the immediate need to disinfect and dispose of infected
corpses, health care workers carried out burials before notifying families [92]. In 1995, during
the Kikwit epidemic, all deceased individuals were buried in individual or common graves by
the Red Cross staff. The body of one individual, however, was forcibly taken from the hospital
to the family’s home to have a traditional burial [99]. The removal of this body led to another
(and the final) surge of Ebola infections in Kikwit [99].
Fear is not limited to community members, but is also common among health care workers
[96]. These concerns are not unwarranted, as hospital staff are at an increased risk of exposure
[100]. Health care worker infection can be catastrophic, particularly where large populations
are served by an inadequate public health sector. By September 2014, in the West African out-
break, 10% of the deceased were believed to be health care workers [26]. In the Kikwit outbreak
in 1995, 25% of Ebola cases were health care workers, and many left their jobs out of fear of
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contracting the disease [96,101]. Understaffing of hospitals involved in Ebola outbreaks has led
to staff working longer and harder, resulting in exhaustion and an increased potential for
deadly mistakes.
Stigmatization and implications to outbreak containment efforts
Health stigmas can influence the behavior of both the infected and the uninfected during an
epidemic, introducing barriers to outbreak management and potentially influencing pathogen
transmission and spread, as well as disrupting social cohesion. The AIDS pandemic provided
important insight into the critical impacts health-related stigma and social hostility can have
on epidemic control measures, highlighting the absolute need to consider these elements in
public health strategy development and response [102]. Ebola has perhaps provided a more ex-
treme example. Health care workers, critical to outbreak management, have been harshly stig-
matized during Ebola outbreaks, rejected by their communities and families, and even stoned
by community members, as they were believed to act as a reservoir for the virus [99]. These
same beliefs and stigmas have impacted health-seeking behavior, with the fear of contracting
Ebola from health care workers influencing the decision to seek medical help [103]. Fear of
stigmatization can influence disease reporting, with victims and their families failing to notify
authorities of possible infection because of the potential negative response of their neighbors
and community [104]. Ebola survivors can also be heavily stigmatized—many survivors are
rejected by their communities, have their belongings burned, and are not allowed to share com-
mon amenities [92]. Data from the 2001 Uganda outbreak suggest female survivors experi-
enced more stigmatization than male survivors [92]. Stigmatization can reach beyond the
immediate family, as for example in Uganda, where relatives of survivors and the deceased
were also stigmatized once the names were publicly released [96]. Fear of stigmatization is not
necessarily limited to the level of the individual, household, or community, but may also extend
to the level of country governance in which concerns over international response may influence
reporting of health information [105]. Health-related stigma has been a prominent feature of
the outbreak in West Africa [104] and likely a contributor to the difficulties identified in con-
taining the epidemic.
Health education is one of the keys to combating many issues surrounding Ebola outbreaks,
including trust of health officials, the use of non-traditional burial practices, and the acceptance
of survivors, relatives of the deceased, and health care workers back into their communities.
Health education was seen as one of the major factors in stopping the DRC Ebola outbreak in
1995 [101], and along with contact-tracing and quarantine in the Congo (1995) and Uganda
(2000) outbreaks, health education was believed to decrease the effective reproductive rate of
Ebola and reduce the final epidemic size by a factor of 2 [106]. However, as important as it is to
develop and share health messages, the messages must engage the culture and traditions of the
target group or risk having no effect or, worse, a negative effect.
Ebola Forecasting, Detection Control, Education, and Future Needs
Containment of the West African Ebola outbreak is the most pressing, immediate need. This
effort will require mobilization of many additional resources, including medical personnel, ed-
ucators’ supplies, food, water, and other essential needs. Additional issues need to be addressed
to prepare other countries for the possibility of Ebola importation or emergence. Below, we
highlight example recommendations that might support enhanced country-level preparedness
in Africa and elsewhere, while recognizing that many of these recommendations may be very
difficult to implement in the West African countries currently combatting Ebola.
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1. Partnerships and coordinated outbreak response: Coordinated development of communi-
cation strategies and surveillance partnerships across the region will be needed. Govern-
ments outside the outbreak region will need to be actively included and assisted as needed
to develop national detection and response strategies and protocols. Regional meetings of
Health Ministers (e.g., 2nd Extra Ordinary Ministers of Health Meeting on Ebola Virus Dis-
ease in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, September 4–5, 2014) provide important venues for bring-
ing scientists and policymakers together to ensure that frontline countries have access to the
resources they need to manage potential spread and outbreak response. Developing sus-
tained partnerships across Africa and the international community will be critical for our
ability to contain this and future epidemics.
2. Outbreak response in resource-poor settings: Information collection and communication
will still be a challenge in resource-poor settings, and specific strategies will need to be devel-
oped to allow rapid identification and response within the context and constraints identified
in the local environment. Integrated approaches involving both human and animal health
must be developed that engage the research, law enforcement, and policy environments
within these local settings.
3. Human movement:While protocols have been developed to isolate and test any people dis-
playing signs of illness at cross-border crossings (e.g., http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/
index.html), protocols are also needed to manage illegal immigrant investigation and hold-
ing protocols. These individuals may not have travel documents indicating country visita-
tion or citizenship. Management of these immigrants is often undertaken by multiple
agencies (immigration, police, and defense forces). Appropriate training and procedures
must be identified to address the multiagency nature of the activity and to allow for safe and
respectful management of such individuals during times of heightened concern over human
mobility and EBOV spread. Controls on borders must be done securely but in a manner
that allows movement of critical supplies to affected regions.
4. Need for continuing molecular epidemiological outbreak assessments: Access to samples
from the current outbreak is challenging, given the already-impossible burden placed on
health staff active in the outbreak site. However, any samples and/or DNA sequence data
available should be made accessible to the public health community as soon as possible in
order to allow molecular investigations to advance. This will facilitate refinement of our un-
derstanding of transmission pathways (e.g., through determining transmission networks)
and public health implications, among other areas of need. This information is urgently
needed to address the challenge of containing this current outbreak and identifying appro-
priate control measures.
5. Modelling tools and data gaps:Modelling may provide essential information on potential
scenarios for outbreak progression, intervention design, and logistics planning [107]. Data
gaps in the outbreak region have been significant, however, limiting the full use of this tool
set and our ability to address operational needs. Funding priorities for Ebola and other
health research in Africa should be outcome-oriented and directed at addressing identified
data gaps that are key to prevention and control in order to address immediate needs.
Agent-based approaches can incorporate complex cultural and behavioral norms and can
be used to direct data collection in data-poor environments [108]. Social media data are
often used in public health, both in tracking infections and in delivery of health messages
[109,110]. Lack of internet access in the current outbreak requires innovative approaches
that will allow bridging of these essential data gaps and delivery opportunities for health
messages. Two types of modelling efforts will be important, one that engages emergent
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needs in an outbreak and a second directed at understanding broader elements of the epi-
demic and preventing future outbreaks. The scope and focus of each are complementary
and allow scalable assessments of outbreak needs, both present and future.
6. Bushmeat movement and use within Africa—increasing our ability to prevent spillover:
Wildlife smuggling and bushmeat trafficking occur extensively regionally and international-
ly. Wildlife meat is often deboned and skinned to decrease the likelihood of detection, and
can be mistakenly identified as livestock meat. Protocols need to be developed for the safe
seizure of suspected or known wildlife products at border crossings or elsewhere in country.
Patterns of illegal bushmeat trafficking within and between African countries should be a
priority area of investigation and areas of increased risk identified as best as possible for pur-
poses of future outbreak prevention.
Fig 8. Schematic Ebola early-warning system.Development of any early-warning system for the prevention of future Ebola outbreaks will require a
multiscaled effort that spans the international level down to the community, engaging partnerships between and within levels. The most important element of
surveillance will be the effective engagement of local communities in regions of concern. A community-driven wildlife surveillance strategy should be
designed through participatory approaches, driven by traditional leaders in partnership with country governments. Developed communication networks
would need to engage forest users regarding observations of deceased or sick wildlife, in particular those species associated with Ebola outbreaks
previously. Sociological assessments and community consultation would be needed to identify barriers to reporting dead or sick wildlife and development of
appropriate educational approaches and other social interventions. While international assistance will be important, government and community ownership
of the process at the national and local level will be important for sustainability. Research into Ebola reservoir and transmission dynamics will be essential to
refining surveillance approaches.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0003652.g008
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7. Multiscale early-warning systems and future preparedness strategies:While international
and regional modelling efforts provide important tools for forecasting risk zones, community-
based surveillance will be necessary to effectively identify Ebola emergence in wildlife (detection
of death and/or sickness) before outbreaks occur at the local level (Fig 8). Public health educa-
tion will be important in reducing behaviors that increase risk of spillover from wildlife sources.
8. Global Public Health Education Needs: Public health education regarding Ebola dynamics
and transmission is not only needed urgently in Africa but, increasingly, around the world.
In the US, public panic appears to be escalating, and there is the risk that choices may be
driven by fear rather than fact [31]. A focused program of communication from public
health officials is urgently needed and should involve multiple outlets such as radio, televi-
sion, and social media platforms. These communications should provide factual informa-
tion concerning the management of Ebola risk, tailored to the target population.
Africa is a changing landscape, and our approaches will have to engage the complexities of the
region and community livelihoods. It is clear that many factors could have contributed to the
emergence of Ebola inWest Africa. Increasing population size, social unrest, and poverty have un-
doubtedly influenced both the explosive and sustained nature of this epidemic and our collective
inability to contain it. We will need to rethink our approach to disease emergence events in low-
resource areas, where significant knowledge gaps exist and operational barriers impede isolation
and control efforts. The doctors, nurses, public health officials, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and political leaders are presently challenged with on-the-fly responses to public health
emergencies in a low-resource area and are to be congratulated for their ingenuity and persever-
ance. The real partnerships that are emerging among community leaders, NGOs, governments,
and international agencies must be encouraged and facilitated to the greatest possible extent.
Key Learning Points
• Significant political, social, and environmental changes have occurred in West Africa,
likely contributing to the emergence of the most deadly Ebola outbreak in history.
• Similarity in outbreak characteristics (including R0, symptoms, incubation time, and
serial time) between West Africa and previous Ebola outbreaks suggests that there has
not been any significant change in the virus affecting transmissibility.
• Information collection and communication remain a challenge in resource-poor set-
tings and specific strategies and tools will need to be developed to allow rapid identifi-
cation and response within the context and constraints identified in the
local environment.
• Integrated approaches involving both human and animal health must be developed
that engage the research, law enforcement, and policy environments within these
local settings.
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